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1.1 History and development of the UDRP 
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 1 (UDRP) is a policy with the purpose to find 
solutions for disputes concerning domain names less time and money consuming than the 
classic in-court litigation. The UDRP is going back to a report published by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)2 3 of 30th April 1999 dealing with domain 
names, the misuse of domain name registration and the solution of those conflicts.  
 
Since 1998 the Internet’s domain name system is administered by the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers4 ("ICANN"). ICANN is a non-profit organisation 
under the authority of the U.S. Department of Commerce5. The ICANN adopted the report 
of WIPO into the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy by 27th May 1999. This policy is 
now part of every agreement between a domain name registrar and a consumer as long as 
Generic Top Level Domain names like .biz, .com, .info, .name, .net, or .org are in 
concern6. In case of a dispute concerning a Country Code Top Level Domain name 
(ccTLD) the UDRP can be base for the procedure if the concerned ccTLD registration 
authority adopted the UDRP Policy on a voluntary basis.7
 
At 29th November 1999 the WIPO has been approved as the first dispute resolution service 
provider. In the meantime there are 3 more arbitration organisations approved by the 
ICANN, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) based in the USA, the Institute for 
Dispute Resolution based in the USA as well and the Asian Domain name Dispute 
Resolution Centre [ADNDRC] with two offices, in Beijing and Hong Kong. 
The former approved Disputes.org/eResolution consortium (DeC) does not exist anymore.  
Until now there is a total amount of more than 12,000 cases filed under the UDRP with 
these organisations.8
12 
                                                          
1 In following called “UDRP” 
2 In following called “WIPO” 
3 “The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues” Final Report of the 
WIPO Internet Domain name Process 
4 In following called “ICANN” 
5 Mueller, “Rough Justice”, p. 5 
6 Note 2 of the Uniform Domain name Dispute Resolution Policy. 
7 Scope of the Uniform Domain name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at: 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/guide/index.html 
8 http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm [last visited 24.03.2003] 
  
 
1.2 Aim of the work 
The UDRP has been criticised from the beginning on. One of the most extensive critics 
has been arisen by Elizabeth G. Thornburg9. Main object of her critics were: 
 
- The general question whether ICANN was entitled to form a new kind of law 
governing the a huge amount of the domain names registered globally10 
- The possibility for the complainant to choose the approved dispute resolution 
provider11 
- The lack of fairness since the domain name holder was forced to contract under the 
jurisdiction of the UDRP because that is the only way to register for a Generic Top 
Level Domain Name12 
- The lack of procedural fairness in favour for the complainant13 
- The fact of no review mechanism14 
- The probability of conflicting decisions of different panels in comparable cases15 
- A bias of the decisions in favour for the owner of the trademark16 
 
This work will not deal with the question whether or not the critics are justified or not and 
whether the policy is biased in favour for the commercial users of domain names – the 
owners of the marks. In fact as far as I can see this was not the scope of any large study so 
far. 
The fact that 78% of the complaints result in a transfer or cancellation of the domain name 
may arise the question of independence. But pure statistics and rare numbers are not able 
to proof the complaint of bias. In opposition a detailed analysis of the decisions and the 
merits of the cases would be necessary to decide this question. 
13 
                                                          
9 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002 
10 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [208] 
11 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [214] 
12 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [215] 
13 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [216] 
14 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [224] 
15 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [211] 
16 Elizabeth G. Thornburg “Fast, cheap, and out of control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process”, Small & Emerging Business Law, 2002, Note [220] 
  
 
Another source of misunderstanding might be the lack of knowledge about the meaning of 
the operative facts of the policy. 
 
Aim of this work is merely to display the nature of the UDRP and to analyse the operative 
facts of the sec. 4 of the policy to find out the meaning of the terms used to make the result 
of the proceeding under the UDRP more predictable and more comprehensible. By doing 
so I will spot out some weak points and uncertainties in the policy and ambiguous 
interpretations by the panels.  
 
Therefore after an introduction dealing with the particularities of the Policy I will analyse 
decided and published cases with the focus on the findings dealing with the elements of 
sec. 4 (a) of the UDRP. Since the WIPO is the provider with the biggest amount of 
decided cases per year17, I will concentrate on its decisions.  
 
1.3 Aim of the UDRP 
As mentioned, the aim of the UDRP is to help find solutions in domain name disputes in a 
more efficient way than the in-court litigation is able to. 
  
It wants to grant global uniformity in decisions dealing with cybersquatting and reduce the 
time and costs to get a decision over a dispute18. To achieve this aim the UDRP contents a 
couple of particularities concerning different fields. 
 
 
1.4 Particularities of the UDRP in contrast to arbitration 
 
1.4.1 Agreement of arbitration between complainant and respondent? 
Most national arbitration legislations require a written agreement between the later parties 
of the arbitration. 19 Aim of this agreement is the irrevocable consent of the parties to 
submit any or a certain type of dispute related to a contract to arbitration. 
As the parties agreed to exclude court jurisdiction they want to be sure that no party is able 
to claim legal action against the other one. The national arbitration law provides that 
14 
                                                          
17 http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/statistics/cumulative/results.html [last visited 24.03.2003] 
18 Mueller, “Rough Justice”, p. 5 
19 Art. 7 (2) UNCITRAL Model Law; Sec. 6 (2) Arbitration ACT 1996 UK; Sec. 1 Arbitration Act 1964 SA; 
Sec. 178 (1) Swiss Private International Law Act; Sec. 1031 ZPO Germany. 
  
 
courts shall20 or may21 stay legal proceedings in case the dispute is subject to an 
arbitration agreement. 
 
The UDRP starts from a different approach. Sec. 4 a UDRP provides that the domain 
name applicant has to “submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that 
a third party asserts to the applicable provider”. Thus the domain name holder contracts 
with a registrar for a kind of alternative dispute resolution concerning a possible domain 
name dispute with a third - until now unknown - party. Disputes between the parities of 
the agreement (the later respondent and the registrar) are expressively excluded from the 
agreement.22
Aim of the agreement is the domain holder’s submission to accomplish the UDRP 
proceeding. Thus, there is no agreement between the later complainant and the later 
respondent. The claimant might be an intended beneficiary of the agreement between the 
later respondent and the registrar since he benefits from the agreement between the 
registrar and the later respondent, even if only in a procedural way, but not party of the 
agreement.23
 
1.4.2 Flexibility of the Policy 
In opposition to litigation the parties to an arbitration are not bound by a fixed set of rules 
– the idea of alternative dispute resolution is lead by the principle of party autonomy and 
convenience for the parties.24 Therefore arbitration agreements are usual flexible in the 
way the parties are able to tailor an agreement and therefore a proceeding suitable for the 
certain circumstances of the case. The parties are able to modify almost anything in the 
way they want to.25 They are allowed to decide how their dispute is resolved, over 
different types of applicable laws, venues, respites, kind of evidence necessary etc. and are 
limited by some safeguards and mandatory rules which are necessary in the public 
interest, only.26 This power can be exercised during the negotiation about the arbitration 
agreement or during the proceeding itself, if there is consent between the parties. This is a 
kind of early stage of party autonomy. 
15 
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A look in the UDRP shows that the parties are not able to alter the set of rules provided by 
the UDRP and the ICANN requires from their accredited registrars to include the UDRP 
in the contract with registrants.27
The “parties” are not allowed to change any of the rules besides of the language of the 
proceeding28. There is no bargaining between the parties about the details of the 
arbitration, not with the registrar since the conditions are fixed and definitely not with the 
complainant since there is no contact before the dispute arises. Even after the dispute has 
been filed with an UDRP provider, there is no bargaining possible. 
 
Of course the complainant and respondent are allowed to stipulate about a different set of 
rules but as a consequence they would not be able to get a decision under the UDRP by an 
approved provider. Thus, the proceeding would be a totally different one. The 
consequence would be that advantage of the UDRP proceeding, the “automatically” 
cancellation or transfer of the domain under sec. 4 I UDRP would not be available for the 
complainant anymore. 
 
Thus, the UDRP rules invert a big part of the advantages the parties of arbitration 
proceedings usually look for. 
 
1.4.3 Included types of dispute 
Arbitration agreements usually contain a clause to provide for the reference to arbitration 
any dispute or any dispute relating to a matter specified in the agreement.29 Normally the 
parties agree at least that an entire type of conflict is not going to court.30 This is the 
reason why they decided for arbitration, the parties want to get arbitration solutions for at 
least a broad variety if not for all conflicts possible. 
In case of dispute resolution under the UDRP the “parties”31 agree to conduct under the 
UDRP rules in only one case, the disputes about the infringement of a trademark or 
service mark in certain circumstances32. 
It is arguable whether the UDRP panel has the discretion to decide other matters than 
trademark disputes. 
16 
                                                          
27 3.8 Registrar Accreditation Agreement 
28 11 UDRP Rules. 
29 Sec.1 “arbitration agreement” Arbitration Act SA. 
30 Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel & Thomas J. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law 20.2.2 (1994). 
31 In fact they are not the parties of the dispute but the domain name holder and the registrar. See above. 
  
 
A possible indication could be found in the UDRP rules. “A Panel shall decide a 
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with 
the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”33 
That could mean that the panel is allowed to deal with and decide over all matters it wants 
to.34
But on the other hand sec. 4 a and 5 UDRP define the applicable disputes very 
unambiguous. Sec. 5 UDRP refers all other disputes to court, arbitration or other 
proceedings.  
 
1.4.4 Appointment of the tribunal 
In arbitration the appointment of the arbitral tribunal is very important to the parties. 
Therefore all arbitration legislations and arbitration rules are very concerned toguarantee 
an appointment of the tribunal in a fair way. They content provisions dealing with the 
appointment in case that the parties cannot find consents about the tribunal35 and 
provisions dealing procedure of challenging of an arbitrator36. In case of the UDRP the 
complainant chooses the “provider”37, the provider is the organisation, which conducts the 
administrative proceeding and this organisation choose the panel. So in fact the 
complainant can appoint the “arbitration institution”. This seems to be very unique for an 
alternative dispute resolution scheme and might be a problem in terms of fairness. Even if 
there if no real reason for being suspicious, the domain name holder will be concerned 
whether the organisation might be independent and impartial if the complainant chooses 
organisation and, as provided in sec. 4 (g) UDRP, pays its fees38. 
Additional, there is no option to solve the dispute in an ad-hoc arbitration, what means 
using a tribunal but no service of an arbitration institution. 
 
1.4.5 UDRP does not apply a certain set of rules 
Arbitration agreements usually contain a clause determine which substantial law shall 
apply. If there is no such clause the tribunal has to decide for the applicable law of the 
17 
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35 E.g. Article 6 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Sec. 16 Arbitration Act UK. 
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merits by the indications.39 Arbitration agreements do not have to decide for a national 
legislation. The parties are allowed to choose more than one type of national legislation or 
another type of rules.40
Dispute resolution under the UDRP does not apply to a set of rules derived from a certain 
national legislation or a kind of international “law”. All the panel can apply is the UDRP 
and the Rules for Uniform Domain name Dispute Resolution Policy. The later contains 
provisions dealing with the proceeding, the Policy provisions dealing with substantive 
law. The panels are supposed to interpret the policy as it is.41
In fact the panel has to deal with national law as well since it has to decide about cases 
related to trademark infringements.42 The panel applies the trademark law that governs the 
respondent’s actions.43
 
1.4.6 Exclusivity of the proceeding and appeal 
Another very important feature of arbitration is “finality”. Arbitration awards are, 
depending on the applicable law, to a certain extent object of appeal or review. In general, 
an arbitration award is final, since the parties agreed to have the dispute resolved by a 
tribunal.44 That does not mean a decision of court is not totally excluded but an appeal or a 
review is much less likely than in any case of judgement. 
 
1.4.6.1 Possibilities of attacking an award 
An arbitration award can be attacked in different ways, depending on the applicable 
national arbitration law since different legislations are more or less willing to review 
awards in their courts45, but in general the aim of arbitration is to get a final award in term 
of the merits. Only in certain circumstances the court is allowed to deal with the matter of 
the case46 and usually the grounds possible for a review by court are very limited.47  
 
18 
                                                          
39 Beda Wortmann Choice of Law by Arbitrators : The Applicable Conflict of Laws System Arbitration 
International Vol. 14 p. 98 
40 Beda Wortmann Choice of Law by Arbitrators : The Applicable Conflict of Laws System Arbitration 
International Vol. 14 p. 100-102 
41 UDRP – A Study by the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and 
Competition Law, p. 12 
42 From now on I will call the conflict of a domain name with a existing mark “trademark infringement” 
even if it is not the correct expression since the mark itself will not be infringed by a domain name with a 
identical or confusingly similar wording. 
43 Peter Frampton vs. Frampton Enterprises, Inc. D2002-0141 (peterframpton.com) 
44 Butler, Arbitration in South Africa, p.22. 
45 Butler, South African arbitration legislation – the need for reform, p.123 
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The aim of the national arbitration law is to guarantee fairness, balance of powers between 
the parties and the public policy.  
The law has to find the balance between the freedom for arbitration and the guarantee of 
the fairness etc. Some arbitration legislation weigh the continuance of the arbitration 
award heavier that the right to review48, for others is the supervision of the proceeding and 
the fairness of the outcome is more important than the freedom to contract and party 
autonomy.49
This balance is important since the permission to review or appeal on too many reasons 
permits the losing party to question the finality of the award and jeopardise the object of 
the arbitral proceeding.50  
 
1.4.6.2 UDRP panel decision 
The approach of the UDRP is totally different. Even if it does not allow an appeal in the 
meaning that there is no panel of appeal or review proceeding under the UDRP51, it 
provides: “The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 
shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of 
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative 
proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.”52  
 
After the decision the panel waits for 10 business days until it submits it to the registrar. 
During this time the complaint has the opportunity to apply for legal action.53 
Accordingly, the provider will not submit its decision to the registrar in case of a lawsuit 
still in process as well. 
Thus the UDRP allows expressly both parties to submit the dispute to a court when the 
UDRP proceeding is finished or before it has commenced. It even contains provisions of 
the procedure if the UDRP proceeding and the lawsuit are running at the same time. If the 
lawsuit is still in process at the time the panel already found a decision and the panel gets 
an official documentation of the lawsuit, it will not enforce the panel’s decision.54
19 
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With reference to the duration of litigation and the UDRP proceeding, it will be very 
likely that the panel has to “wait” for the court judgement.  
 
1.4.6.3 Permission to parallel court action 
If the UDRP tries to resolve disputes, the question arises why it allows a parallel lawsuit 
since finality is a point of great importance to the parties of arbitration. 
The answer lies in the aim of the UDRP. The UDRP’s aim is to provide trademark and 
service mark owners a fast service to protect their rights. It does not put in claim to be a 
final mechanism of dispute resolution.55 It wants to be fast and efficient, it does not want 
to exclude courts, it want to be an additional way of dispute resolution. Therefore it is 
understandable that it allows the parties to start legal actions. 
 
1.4.6.4 Binding of the court by panel decision 
As shown above usually the panel decisions will be much faster than the court 
judgements.  
Thus the question arises whether the court is bound by the panel decision in any way. 
In several US American cases the court did not even discussed the possibility of binding 
by their outcome56 or refused to acknowledge any binding of the court panel’s decision57.  
 
In Weber-Stephen Products co. v. Armitage Hardware and Building Supply, Inc. the court 
stated: “Neither the ICANN Policy nor its governing rules dictate to courts what weight 
should be given to a panel's decision”.58 Even the panels itself consider their decisions as 
not binding to national courts.59 Following, the court is not bound and does not feel bound 
by the panel decision at all. 
 
In my opinion the answer about whether there is binding or not, lies in the UDRP itself. 
An alternative dispute resolution policy that provides that there can be a court action 
before, after or at the same time like the mandatory proceeding cannot be binding to 
courts. It does not put the claim to be final and since it is the basis of the agreement 
between the parties, the parties cannot expect to get a final decision. The UDRP is more 
20 
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like a provisional process. In case the parties are satisfied with the outcome and the 
reasons it is based on, they will not apply to court. In case either the complainant or the 
respondent is not satisfied, they are expecting a judgement by acourt, free of any binding 
or prejudice by the UDRP outcome. 
 
No other result is possible since the complainant is not a real party of the agreement.  
Even as an intended beneficiary of the agreement between domain name holder (the later 
respondent) and the registrar, he cannot be restraint to apply for a court judgement, since it 
would not be beneficiary to him.60
 
As the UDRP itself provides, even the respondent, who is party of the agreement, is not 
restraint to submit the dispute to a court.61 Following the “mandatory” administrative 
proceeding is not mandatory at all, neither to claimant, since he is not a party of the 
agreement nor to the respondent since the UDRP allows him a submit the dispute to court. 
The UDRP does not provide any penalties in case the respondent does not reply on the 
complaint.  
 
Another very important argument against the finality of the UDRP decision is the narrow 
focus of disputes the UDRP panel is dealing with. As seen above the panel decides about 
trademark and service mark infringement only within these cases about the so-called cases 
of cybersquatting. There are much more disputes possible, for example if both parties are 
holder of identical or confusingly similar trademarks but in different countries. In these 
cases the panel cannot transfer the domain name since the respondent has a legitimate 
interest in the name. A court has to consider much more legal factors since it is not limited 
by the rules of the UDRP. 
And even in cases of cybersquatting there a much more disputes thinkable, like damages, 
interim measures, costs of the process etc. In all these cases the parties have to apply to 
court for a decision. And it is not very likely that a court will feel bound by a UDRP 
decision about the transfer of the domain name in it decision about damages since this 
would be a different question of law and facts. 
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1.4.7 Binding of panel by court decision 
Sec. 18 of the Rules for Uniform Domain name Dispute Resolution Policy provide that in 
the event of any legal proceeding initiated during or prior the administrative UDRP 
proceeding in respect of the domain name in issue, the panel has the discretion to decide 
whether it proceeds the administrative proceeding or not. If the panel terminates or 
suspends the proceeding may depend on: 
 
- Whether a request of one of the parties to do so exists 
- The decision will deal with the domain dame dispute itself 
- An court order to take custody of the domain name in issue since the respondent 
would not be able anymore to transfer the name62 
 
It states that the mandatory proceeding does not has to be terminated or suspended 
automatically just because of a legal action in front of a national court. Instead the panel 
has a wide discretion.63  
It might be clear that the panel is bound by decisions of court in respect of preliminary 
questions like the existence of a trademark etc.64 The panel does not have jurisdiction to 
decide whether one of the parties trademark registrations is valid or not. This question has 
to be answered by the court. As long as the registration exists the panel assumes its 
legality. The same has to be said if the legality of content of the website65 or the general 
business activities of a party66 is in question. 
But what is the consequence once the court decided the registration of the domain name in 
dispute by the respondent was legal? Does this judgement bind the panel when the 
complainant files a complaint with an UDRP provider? 
 
During my research I only could find one decision dealing with the existence and binding 
of a court decision. The practical reason therefore might be that usually the parties get the 
panel decision much earlier than the one by the court. 
 
In this one case a French court held in its decision that the respondent had a right to use 
the domain name. The panel held that, even if it does “not necessarily agree with the 
22 
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content of the French decision”, it is compelled to consider the existence of the decision 
and its force in law. The panel recognised the determination of a right by the French court 
as its own determination. It tested the usual operative facts as well but held: “For the 
record, thus, it seems that issues connected with Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy may have 
been solved in favour of the complainants, had not the Paris decision created a ‘right’ of 
the respondent on the domain name preventing the Panel from finding for the 
complainants.”67 This decision makes very clear that the panel felt bound by the court 
decision even if its own opinion differed from the court’s one.  
 
Problems may arise if courts in different countries assume jurisdiction about the same case 
and get to different results. But this scenario is not very likely at all.  
 
1.5 Summary 
The proceeding under the UDRP differs in a lot of points from the proceeding usually 
known in arbitration.  
These differences originate from the aims of the UDRP – cost and time efficiency and its 
provisional character. 
The UDRP is the first step to find a solution for a domain name dispute. 
 
Particularities like the lack of flexibility, the limited jurisdiction of the panel etc. are 
related to the objective of speed and economy. 
The lack of finality etc. is justified since the UDRP does not put in claim to be a substitute 
for court litigation. 
 
The understanding of these particularities is necessary for the understanding of some of 
the panel decisions in domain name disputes. 
 
1.6 Success of the UDRP 
After all disadvantages shown the question arises why the UDRP is so successful. Parties 
would not be willing to accept the disadvantages of the Policy if it would not achieve its 
aims. Does the UDRP is able to convince the consumer? 
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1.6.1 Time  
As in all ADR and ODR schemes one of the advantages of UDRP is efficiency of the use 
of time. In average a dispute filed by one of the approved providers takes between 45 and 
60 days from the complaint to the award.68 There may be some differences between the 
different providers, but all panels are working very fast in general.  
 
Decision time RSP 
40 days or more  Below 40 days 
Total 
Total 
E-Resolutions 39 (80%) 10 (20%) 49 (mean = 55 
days) 
NAF 76 (30%) 176 (70%) 252 (mean = 37 
days) 
WIPO 182 (57%) 138 (43%) 320 (mean = 45 
days) 
Totals 297 (48%) 324 (52%) 621 cases 
69
 
This speed is a consequence of some provisions of the UDRP which provide that for 
example the respondent shall response within 20 days of the commencement of 
administrative proceeding70 or the panel shall in case of the absence of exceptional 
circumstances forward its decision within 14 days of its appointment.71
Another reason for the speed is the limited use of UDRP for just one specific kind of 
disputes. Even if this limitation is a point of critics a lot of times, it ensures that the panels 
are able to find a solution very fast. 
 
Under no legislation in the world it will be possible to get an enforceable judgement after 
2 month. Just the first stage of in-court litigation can take 6 month easily. From that place 
even the “slowest” of the provider is much faster than the fastest classical litigation. 
 
1.6.2 Costs 
The UDRP dispute resolution is much cheaper than in-court litigation and even cheaper as 
the most Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes. The reason for this advantage grounds 
in a couple of reasons. 
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As shown above the UDRP is limited to one type of disputes what minimises the time 
required to find a solution. Of course this speed in proceedings takes effect on the costs of 
the whole process. Additional like all ODR schemes, UDRP does not take place in courts 
or a certain office. No one of the parties or the members of the tribunal has to travel to 
different places to appear in a hearing. All communication occurs in written, by e-mail or 
in form of paper. This is a much cheaper way of communication than appearance in court 
or even official service by the authority. 
 
1.6.3 “Self-executing” awards 
A very important and very unique advantage of the UDRP is the kind of enforcement of 
the award. Sec. 3 of the UDRP provides the cancellation, transfer or change in another 
way of the domain name registration if (Sec. 3 b UDRP) the ICANN receipts an order 
from a court or tribunal or (Sec. 3 c UDRP) from an Administrative Panel. Administrative 
Panel means a decision by one of the four organisations approved with the ICANN. 
Therefore the award occurred after the whole process is self-executing. That means that 
there is no recognition of the award by a court, different in nationality or not, necessary. 
The domain name will just be transferred or cancelled in case of an adequate order of a 
court, tribunal or Administrative Panel.  
 
Even though the time of enforcement is not understood as being part of the proceeding, 
litigation or another dispute resolution option itself, for the complainant it is one of the 
most important advantages since he is not interested in an award, judgement or any other 
decision, if he is not able to enforce it in a reasonable time. Given that a lot of disputes 
dealing with domain names are of international nature, the enforcement of a judgement 
would be even more difficult. 
 
These advantages are the reason for the great success of the UDRP. Notwithstanding the 
problems and limitations the parties have to face, the UDRP is a very much-used tool to 
resolve disputes. 
1.6.4 Non-finality 
Even the non-finality of the UDRP proceeding might be an advantage. As shown above 
the parties consider the UDRP proceeding as a first step for dispute resolution. Since they 
are not bound by the outcome they might see over the disadvantages and deficiencies of 
the proceeding. In case of a binding award the proceeding and its scope would have to be 
25 
                                                                                                                                                                              
71 Para. 15 (b) Rules for UDRP 
  
 
much wider to gain the same success the UDRP gained in the last years. So, in fact the 




2. Legal certainty and the UDRP - The application of the operative facts of Sec. 4 (a) 
of the policy 
As shown above the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy provides a couple of grave 
advantages for owners of marks to protect their marks and businesses against 
“infringement” by domain names in opposition to classic in-court litigation. 
In connection of this protection the question arises in which cases the UDRP grants 
protection, in which case the complaint will probably be successful and it which cases the 
complainant should apply to court for protection. To predict the result of the proceeding 
one has to understand the meaning of the operative facts of sec. 4 UDRP and its related 
sections. 
Some of the terms used in the Policy like “confusingly similar” are ambiguous others are 
not clear at all since they contain general terms like “bad faith”.  
To make the outcome of the mandatory proceeding more predictable I will analyse and 
display the meaning of the operative facts of the policy. 
 
2.1 Sec. 4 (a) (i) UDRP  
“…your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark 
in which the complainant has rights…” 
 
As shown the purpose of the UDRP is to grant fast protection for owners of trademarks 
and service marks against the infringement trough the use of domain names. 
But how can a domain name infringe a mark? Is a domain name not only an address in the 
internet used instead of a long number? Of course technically an internet domain name is 
an address, which enables servers to locate other machines, but that is not all it is. 
A trademark fulfils two objects. It is in indicator of origin and helps to distinct the 
products of one producer from the other.72 A internet domain name is an address and an 
indicator of origin as well. 
Since the internet is a commercial environment the internet addresses got a commercial 




or the failure of an internet business. The WIPO final report stated: “precisely because 
they [the internet domain names] are easy to remember and to identify, however, domain 
names have come to acquire a supplementary existence as business or personal 
identifiers.”73 The use of a domain name will not infringe the trademark itself. The 
question the UDRP deals with is whether the owner of the mark owns the exclusive right 
to use domain names identical or confusingly similar to his mark. The UDRP is no policy 
to protect the marks itself against infringement. 
 
2.1.1. Trademark or service mark 
 
2.1.1.1 Owner of a registered trademark or service mark 
The complainant will be easily able to proof that he has rights in a mark, if he is owner of 
a registered trademark or service mark. I will show in the following part, that it is not 
necessary to own a registered mark but the registration of a trademark usually is prima 
facie evidence of validity and following for distinctiveness of the mark.74
 
2.1.1.2 Territorial problems with trademark 
Trademark law works territorially, not globally. Their effect is limited to a region, country 
etc. The internet works differently, it is not possible to distinguish between different 
countries etc. Every domain name is and has to be unique globally for technical reasons. 
Accordingly the UDRP cannot be bound by the limitation of trademark law in respect of 
territories since this would limit the right of a person to use a domain exclusively to a 
certain region, country etc. 
 
In Funskool (India) Ltd. v. funschool.com Corporation the panel stated: “The Policy 
places no limitation on the operative extent of a trademark, which the complainant must 
show the disputed domain name to be identical or confusingly similar to. If the intention 
had been that the complainant’s right to complain about registration and use of a domain 
name which is identical or confusingly similar to its trademark had to be limited to a 
trademark recognised by the law of the respondent’s country of incorporation or residence, 
the Policy would have said so expressly”.75
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The local effect or popularity of a trademark can be of importance in respect of the 
existence “bad faith” as I will show below. 
 
As shown above the panel has to apply national trademark law to determine whether the 
complainant or the respondent is owner of a mark. 76 The same has to be said about the 
question whether one of the parties owns a mark under common law. The panel has to 
decide under national law whether an unregistered mark exists or not.77
 
2.1.1.3 Unregistered trademark or service mark 
Sec. 4 (a) (i) UDRP reads “trademark or service mark”, it does not require that the 
complainant has rights in a registered trademark or service mark. It is sufficient for the 
complaint if the complainant is holder of a trademark under common law.78 Here again, 
the base for the question whether an unregistered trademark exists, is the national 
trademark law that governs the respondent’s actions.79 Problems may arise if the national 
trademark law does not know unregistered marks.80 But usually the national law 
recognises something comparable. German law grants protection for non-registered 
“marks” under sec. 1 (2) Markengesetz as “Geschaeftliche Bezeichnung”. 
 
Further a registration of a trademark by the respondent alone does not create a right to use 
the name as a domain name if the respondent registered the trademark to protect his 
domain name only.81 Following, a registered mark is not per se stronger than an 
unregistered mark in any case. 
 
The WIPO accepted the existence of a mark under common law, if the name has achieved 
international recognition and critical acclaim for the works identified above and that use of 
that mark has come to be recognised by the general public as indicating an association 
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Under common law the easiest way to proof the existence of an unregistered trademark is, 
to show that the unauthorised use of the name by another person than the owner for a 
commercial purpose would be passing off.84 Accordingly, if the unauthorised use would 
be passing off, there is protection of an unregistered trademark. The wrong, known as 
passing of consists in the misrepresentation of businesses – the misrepresentation that the 
business of one person is that of another or associated with that of another. Additional 
passing of requires the reasonable likelihood that members of the public might be 
confused about the representation.85
 
2.1.1.4 Personal names as unregistered marks 
Even if it seems to be well established that the UDRP recognises common law trademarks 
in personal names86 the policy does not make clear to what extent personal names are 
subject of the protection. 
In The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v. Alberta Hot Rods the panel held that “In light of 
the Second WIPO Domain Name Process, it is clear that the Policy is not intended to 
apply to personal names that have not been used commercially and acquired secondary 
meaning as the source of goods and/or services…”87
In any case pure personality rights shall not be subject of the dispute resolution under the 
UDRP. 88 A reason therefore might be that the protection of personal names differs a lot 
around the world.89 Hence the lack of international uniformity in the protection of names 
would jeopardise the credibility and efficiency of the policy.90
But this requirement of commercial use of the personal name might be a reason for the 
opinion that the policy is biased in favour for commercial users of domain names in 
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As displayed above, a person who seeks protection for his personal name has to be able to 
proof the recognition of the use as a trademark or service mark.92
To enjoy the protection as a mark the complainant has to establish the distinctive character 
of the name and that the use as a domain name of his name by another person than himself 
would confuse the consumer. 93 This will be much more likely if the name in questions has 
no other meaning94 95 beside the complainant’s name and enjoys great popularity.  If the 
domain name contains exclusively of words common in any wide spread language, the 
success of the complaint is not very likely since probably the name will not be distinctive 
enough to qualify as a mark (Sting.com).96 On the other hand in at least one case the panel 
transferred the domain name notwithstanding the name was a common term in a lot of 
languages (Madonna.com).97 98 This decision was criticised in parts of the internet 
community and marked as a proof for the general bias of the UDRP.99
 
The name does not have to be popular in some way only. It is further necessary that the 
name is a widely recognised source for a product or service – that the name has have 
gained secondary meaning.100 Otherwise it will not be recognised as being able to 
distinguish the products or services.101 This recognition can appear in the way that the 
complainant used the name by himself as a marketable commodity or had allowed 
someone else to promote this person’s products or services.102
 
 As said above the main factors of mark protection are: 
- The distinctive character or notoriety of the name and the requirement that the domain 
name must be “identical or confusingly similar” to it. 
- The relationship between this distinctive character and use of the name in connection 
with goods or services in commerce (secondary meaning). 
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- The location of the parties and the bearing that this may have effect on the acquisition 
of unregistered trademark rights.103 
 
Especially the connection between the name in question and a product or service provided 
is very important for recognition of the name as an unregistered mark and was the decisive 
factor in a couple of decisions.104  
 
The connection between the name and the product or service has been the crucial aspect in 
cases of the domain name use of famous business peoples’ names. These cases, in which 
names like “Ted Turner” were used as domain names, are special in the way the names are 
clearly related to business purposes.  
Generally the same as above applies. The name acquired secondary meaning and thus 
distinctive character if it has been recognised as the source of the business or services the 
complainant is famous for. The pure popularity as a businessman does not qualify the 
name for secondary meaning in respect of a product or service and is not sufficient. The 
name has to be connected to a product or service directly.105 In Ted Turner v. Mazen 
Fahmi the panel held that the name “Ted Turner” did not acquire secondary meaning since 
the complainant was not able to proof that he ever offered goods or services under or in 
relation to this name, even if the word “Turner” forms part of some of the major 
companies owned by Ted Turner.106
 
2.1.1.5 Names of intergovernmental organisations 
Intergovernmental organisations (IGO) are international organisations like the United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization. Their names 
and the abbreviations of the names are protected against the use as trademarks by 
Article 6ter of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.107
 
The question arises whether the names of IGOs enjoy special protection against 
cybersquatting. The class of IGOs that may receive protection for their names and 
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acronyms under the international treaties is strictly limited. Only 91 organisations received 
such protection since the establishment of the convention in 1958.108 In general all names 
of IGOs enjoy the protection under the UDRP like marks109 after the IGO communicated 
the name or the abbreviation for which an IGO wishes to obtain protection to the 
International Bureau (Secretariat) of WIPO, which will then transmit the communication 
to the States party to the Paris Convention110. In opposition to other marks they are, with 
some exceptions, blocked for any use at all. Blocked means that they are excluded from 
any use as a trademark possible. The contracting parties agreed to refuse any registration 
of names or acronyms of IGOs. The purpose of this blocking is to ensure that these names 
remain free of private property rights and to avoid any potential for confusion or deception 
that could interfere with the public status of the IGOs.111
 
But this total protection does not concern the use of names or abbreviations of IGOs as 
domain names until now. So far there are no decisions of the WIPO dealing with that 
problem available. The WIPO commissions of the “Final Report of the WIPO Internet 
Domain Name Process” and the “Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name 
Process” dealt with that issue but were not able or willing to grant the same amount of 
protection for IGOs in respect of the use as domain names. 
Accordingly, IGOs have to protect their rights in domain names like any other 
organisation or company. 
 
Instead organisation like IGOs enjoy another kind of protection. The suffix “.int” (for 
international) is reserved for “organisations established by international treaties between 
or among national governments”.112 Thus the question arises whether the .int domain 
names provide a sufficient protection or there is a need for a further protection. 
The limitation of permission to register an .int domain name does not prevent the abuse of 
the names or abbreviations of IGOs in connection with other suffixes. This possible abuse 
can damage the reputation of the organisations. 
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Following, the existing extent of the protection is not satisfying but all the UDRP is able 
to provide by now. 
 
The system of exclusion of the use of names of IGO might be problematic especially as 
far as abbreviations are in concern. The total exclusion of these acronyms would block too 
many domain names for commercial use. 113
Therefore for the future the Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain name Process 
suggests a system of notification by any interested party of the registration as a domain 
name of the name or acronym of an IGO benefiting from protection under article 6ter of 
the Paris Convention.114
 
2.1.1.6 Names of political institutions 
Another problem is the use of names of political or administrative institutions like 
“Auswaertiges Amt” as a domain name.115 In a couple of decision the WIPO panel 
accepted the protection of names like this as trademarks.116
In Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) v. RJG Engineering Inc. 
the panel concluded that there is no reason preventing a public authority from being the 
holder of a trademark right.117 It further stated that the names can be used in the course of 
trade if the ministry or department offers the service ministries or department usually 
offer.118
In case of a trademark use of the name of the administrative institution the authority 
enjoys the same extent of protection as any person or organisation having a right in a 
mark. 
 
2.1.1.7 Geographical identifiers 
With reference to geographical identifiers we have to distinguish between country names 
and other geographical names. 
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2.1.1.7.1 Country names as domain names 
Country names are protected by a number of conventions and treaties, as the Paris 
Convention, the Madrid Agreement For False Or Deceptive Indications Of Source Of 
Goods, The Lisbon Agreement For The Protection Of Appellations Of The Origin and the 
Agreement On Trade Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights.119  
 
The existing protection deals mainly with the trade of goods or with the use or 
misrepresentation of geographical identifiers in relation to goods. If the domain name 
registration is not related to the trade of goods or the offer of services at all, there will be 
no violation of the existing protection.120
Thus, the UDRP cannot give any protection against the use of these names without any 
connection to the trade of goods or services. Reason for this “lack” of protection is not the 
UDRP itself but the gap in the applicable international laws and conventions.121 
Accordingly the WIPO report recommends, that “no modification be made to the UDRP, 
at this stage, to permit complaints to be made concerning the registration and use of 
domain names in violation of the prohibition against false indications of source or the 
rules relating to the protection of geographical indications” should be made.122
 
2.1.1.7.2 Country names as trademarks 
Even if names of countries are not protected as such, they still can be protected under 
general trademark law. There are only a few WIPO cases available dealing with the 
registration of a country name as a domain name.  
123 124In the WIPO case Nez Zealand v. iSMER  the panel decided  that the term “New 
Zealand” has not been used by the complaint to identify any certain good or service but to 
mark all goods and services related to its territory and denied the complaint to transfer the 
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name. The term “New Zealand” had been used as geographical indication of origin for a 
lot of products from different producers.125 126 
In an additional case (under the UDRP) dealing with New Zealand as well, the panel 
decided with the same reasons against the existence of a trademark “New Zealand”.127
These decisions did not deny the abstract possibility of protection but stated that the use of 
the name of the country has to meet the general requirements for trademark protection 
which is its ability to distinguish the product or service of one person from the one of 
another person. This requirement has not been met if the name in question has been used 
to label products or services form more than one source or like in these cases for all 
product originating from one source. 
 
2.1.1.8 Geographical names as marks 
A similar problem arises in cases of the registration of other geographical names as 
domain names. The WIPO Report refuses the protection of geographical names like cities 
or regions per se as well, with the same reason as shown above. 
A protection of the name as a trademark is possible but depends on the general trademark 
rules. 
 
The panels decided in favour of the complaint in two types of cases: 
128- The complainant (the city etc.) was owner of a registered trademark with its name  
- The complainant can proof a trademark under common law 
 
If the complainant wants to proof the existence of a trademark under common law, he has 
to show his activities in offering products or service129 and that “the unregistered mark 
performs the function of distinguishing the goods or services of one person in trade from 
the goods or services of any other person in trade.”130
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As seen above geographical indicators, countries, regions or cities, are not protected 
against the use as domain names per se. The complainant has to proof the ownership or 
right in an existing trademark, registered or under common law. In case of an unregistered 
trademark, the complainant has the burden of proof that the name in question matches the 
general requirements of a common law trademark. 
 
2.1.2 Rights in the trademark 
The complainant does not have to be the owner of the registered or unregistered mark. 
Sec. 4 (a) (i) UDRP only requires that the complainant has rights in the mark. The 
question arises what kind of rights in the trademark the complainant has to have. 
 
In a lot of cases the panels decided that it is sufficient if the complainant is a licensee of 
the owner of the trademark131 132, even if the complainant a sub-licensee . In case of a 
licence the owner of the trademark would still be allowed to file a complaint against the 
respondent since he transferred only limited rights of the trademark.133
 
In SK Energy Sales Co., Ltd. v. Superkay Comdomain the panel stated an opponent 
decision, when it held that “the domain names at issue [can] be transferred only to one of 
the complainants who are the owners of the trademark registrations”. It stated further that 
“A license can and may be revoked at any time. Further, as asserted in the complaint, the 
SPEED MATE marks are closely identified by consumers with SK Corporation, the owner 
of the trademark and service mark registrations, as well as with the complainant. 
Therefore, the Panel concludes that the complainant [the licensee] does not have rights for 
the marks which can override the rights of the owner of the trademark and service mark 
registrations.“134  
Accordingly, the licensee would not be able to face against the infringement of his licence 
without help of the trademark owner.  
 
The question whether or not a licensee is able to enforce his rights by his self may depends 
on the type of licence and the relation to the owner of the trademark. In HCS MISCO v. 
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Christophe CATUREGLI the panel held that the complainant is entitled to enforce his 
licence rights if “the complainant is a licensee who has the right to use the trademark, who 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the trademark owner and is officially authorised to 
represent the trademark owner in this case”.  
 
As far as I can see there is no reason for this restriction in respect of the complaint of a 
licensee. If the complainant has to be the owner of the trademark or an authorised 
representative of the owner, Sec. 4 (a) (i) UDRP would read “…which the complainant is 
owner of” instead of “…in which the complainant has rights in”. 
Obviously the panels did not interpret this part of the provision in the same way. In my 
opinion the difference in the wording of the UDRP must conclude in a difference of the 
requirements. Therefore a licence should be sufficient to assume locus standi. 
 
2.1.3 Identical or confusingly similar 
The domain name has to be identical or at least similar to a certain extent. The aim of the 
UDRP proceeding is the transfer or cancellation of domain names if the public would be 
confused by the similarity of the domain name to a trademark135. Decisive is the 
likelihood of confusion in respect of the origin of the website.136
 
2.1.3.1. Identical 
A domain name is identical to a trademark if the spelling is the same under ignorance of 
the suffix (.com etc.). The suffix itself is not suitable to distinguish the domain name from 
the trademark.137 In some decisions the panel held that the question whether a domain 
name is identical to a mark in respect of the policy is not entirely focused on the spelling 
details of the domain name. In these cases the panel believed an incorrect “spelled” mark 
could be viewed as identical since the consumer may recognise the incorrectly spelled 
word as identical with the correctly spelled word.138 In my opinion this approach is not 
correct. The subjective impression of some users cannot be able to influence the objective 
question of identity. Additional, this approach is not necessary at all since the policy 
provides the same legal consequences no matter if the domain name is identical or 
confusingly similar. The only difference is that a similar domain name has to be 
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confusing, whereas an identical domain name is confusing per se. But in case of a domain 
name so close to the wording of a trademark that the question of identity arises, the 
condition of “confusingly” cannot be an obstacle. 
 
2.1.3.2. Confusingly similar 
Things are more complicate if the domain name is not identical but similar to a certain 
degree. There are five main types of similarity. 
 
2.1.3.2.1 Misspelling (Typosquatting) 
A lot respondents register domain names which differ from trademarks in the way that a 
internet user could be connected to his site if he misspells the name. They take advantage 
of the likelihood of misspelling caused by the ignorance of the correct spelling or by 
typing errors. 
Whether a domain name is confusingly similar or not depends on the distinctiveness of the 
trademark as well. 139 In Reuters Limited v. Global Net the panel held: “A domain name 
which differs by only one letter from a trademark has a greater tendency to be confusingly 
similar to the trademark where the trademark is highly distinctive”140 and that “it is 
helpful to consider the context in which the domain names are being used, as well as the 
aural and visual similarity between the domain names and the complainant’s trade 
mark”141. 
The question whether the mark is sufficient distinctive or not is a factual issue and can be 
answered in context of a certain case only. 
 
A mark can have inherent or acquired distinctiveness. Inherent distinctiveness means the 
term used as a mark is capable to distinguish a product of one source from the products or 
services of another source without educating the relevant public from the beginning on. 
These marks are arbitrary or fanciful in the way that they do not have any logical relation 
to the characteristics of the product. 142
In case of the use of for example a descriptive term as a mark this mark is not distinctive 
from the beginning on but can acquire this secondary meaning in the course of use. 
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Examples for indications of acquired distinctiveness are: 
- long time of use as a mark 
- market share 
- recognition of the relevant group of consumer as a certain source for a product 
143- investment in advertising and marketing  
 
There is no general difference between inherent and acquired distinctiveness. Both kinds 
of marks can have the same extent of distinctiveness. 
 
2.1.3.2.2 Phonetically similarity 
Other respondents register domain name which pronunciation is identical to the 
trademark. This can lead to confusion if the consumers do not know the exactly spelling of 
the name, like “nandos” or “nando’s”144. As in general trademark law, phonetically 
similarity is considered as being sufficient to cause confusion.145 In this cases the same 
like in the misspelling cases mentioned applies. 
 
2.1.3.2.3 Whole incorporation of mark into domain name 
In these cases the domain name contents the whole and correct spelled mark and a prefix 
or suffix. The prefix or suffix can be any word, number or another mark. 
 
2.1.3.2.3.1 Prefix or suffix plus mark 
In some cases the respondents tried to distinct his domain name from the mark in issue by 
adding a common word as a prefix or suffix. This approach can be successful if the term 
used as a prefix or suffix is able to distinct the domain name from the mark. 
 
The combination of the mark with a possessive pronoun (like “my”) does not change the 
significance of the name.146 Additionally, a lot of companies use the prefix “my” for their 
company websites as well.147 It does not distinguish the domain name from the mark. The 
same has to be said to “e-“ as a prefix. “e-“ is a usual prefix for companies to distinguish 
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148their old economy division from the e-commerce division.  In the same way the panel 
decided in the “4microsoft2000.com” case.149
 
As a general rule it can be said that a prefix or suffix can be sufficient to distinct the 
domain name from the mark if it has no logical connection to the mark and the product or 
service offered under this mark. 
  
2.1.3.2.3.2 Mark with geographical term 
An Examples for the use of a mark in connection with a geographical term can be an 
domain name like “aol.Europe.com”. In these cases I could not find one decision in which 
the panel denied the question of similarity. The argument is that the mark is the distinctive 
part of the domain name.150 The country names indicates that the website originates from 
the owner of the trademark and that he uses this domain name for his operations in a 
certain geographical region and is therefore not able to distinguish the domain name from 
the mark.151 The same has to be said about possible cases like “www.ao-leurope.com” 
since they combine the trademark with a geographical term with the use of the 
typosquatting method.152
 
2.1.3.2.3.3 Mark with generic word 
In cases of trademarks in combination with generic terms the question whether the domain 
name is confusingly similar or not depends mainly on two factors: 
 
- Does the trademark dominate the domain name? 
- Does the generic term distinguish the domain name from the trademark? 
 
The bigger the reputation of the mark is, the higher is the likelihood of the domination by 
the mark153 154 155 especially if the mark itself is not descriptive  and not a generic term . 
 
The question of the distinctiveness of the generic term depends on the question whether 
the term is in any connection with the mark itself or the products or services related to the 
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156mark.  For example, the term “machines” in connection with the mark “cat” 
(abbreviation for Caterpillar) cannot be recognised as distinctive since Caterpillar is a very 
successful and famous producer of a certain type of machines and the word “machines” is 
therefore not able to prevent confusion in respect of the connection to or association with 
the owner of the mark. In opposition the logical relation of the two terms manifests the 
impression of such a relation.157 If there is no such logical connection, the consumer will 
not be confused by the use of the domain name because he will not think that the owner of 
the mark is the originator of the website.158 In America Online, Inc. v. GSD Internet 
(aolteen.com) and (icqporn.com) the panel stated that it “does not believe that any 
significant number of people will believe the domain names to have anything to do with 
the complainant”.159 Notwithstanding in Nokia Corporation v. Nokiagirls.com the panel 
stated that “girls” is a neutral term in addition to a trademark160 and does not prevent 
consumer confusion even if the mark is owned by a telecommunication company. 
Obviously the opinion about the question whether a term is able to disconnect a domain 
name from a mark differs very much. 
 
In my opinion the “nokiagirls.com” decision goes to far since it provides an extent of 
protection the UDRP was not designed for. Terms completely unrelated to the mark in 
issue should be considered as distinctive. Otherwise the Policy does not only prevent the 
use of confusing domain names but the use of marks in domain names at all. Whether this 
approach might be rational or correct is another issue but clearly not the intention of the 
policy. 
 
2.1.3.2.4 Domain name plus ”sucks” 
A special problem arises in the cases of the often used connection of a mark with terms 
like “sucks”. These pages usually contain criticism of the owner of the mark or his product 
or service. 
The panel’s decisions can be divided in two opinions. 
 
One the one hand in a number of cases the panels stated that a domain name “is not 
confusingly similar if the name itself signifies the use for critical purposes or parody, as 
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161opposed to imitation of trademark”  because a “confusion in the minds of internet users 
that the domain name is or may very well be a domain name belonging to the complainant 
or licensed by the complainant” is not likely162. 
In these decisions the panels held that terms like “sucks” disassociate the domain name 
from the owner of the trademark in a way that the number of users who do not appreciate 
the significance of the term is very small and not worthy of consideration163, that words 
like that clearly indicate that the domain name has nothing to do with the business of the 
owner of the mark164. 
 
In these kinds of cases the distinctiveness of the spelling of the name from the mark is 
important as well. The term, which has to disassociate the domain name from the mark, is 
not allowed to be similar in spelling like a part of the original mark. The domain name 
“abercrombieandfilth” was not recognised as suitable to disassociate from the mark 
“Abercrombie & Fitch” because of the similar spelling of the words “filth” to “fitch” even 
if the meaning of the name used clearly disassociates the website from the mark.165
 
But most of the decisions do not recognise terms like “sucks” as distinctive even if the 
decision recognise that terms like “sucks”, “anti” or “dontbuy” “are crude attempts to 
tarnish the mark”166 167 since not every user of the internet is well-versed in English . 
Following the use of the mark as a part of the domain name would still lead some people 
to believe the owner of the mark is connected to the respondent or would at least be 
confused about this connection.168
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169Some panels prefer a test common in United States courts . This test consists of eight 
steps:170
 
- Strength of the mark 
- Proximity of the goods 
- Similarity of the marks 
- Evidence of actual confusion 
- Marketing channels 
- Consumer sophistication and care likely to be exercised 
- Respondent's intent in selecting the domain names 
- Likelihood of product line expansion 
 
In my opinion the test, even if useful, has not too much to do with the question of 
confusing similarity itself. It is more like the replacement of the whole sec. 4 UDRP test, 
since it considers much more than the question of actual confusion.  
 
Thus, the panel decisions do not give a clear image of the definition of the meaning of 
“confusingly similar” in the different types shown, the success of the complaint will to a 
certain extent depend on the panellists in charge. 
 
2.1.3.2.5 Abbreviation of mark 
The abbreviation of a mark as a domain name can be confusingly similar if the 
complainant is able to proof that the consumer would associate the abbreviation with the 
mark.171 The answer to this question depends again on the extent the mark and especially 
its abbreviation is known and its distinctiveness from other common abbreviations.172 In 
fact the complainant has to proof the recognition of the abbreviation as an unregistered 
mark by the relevant public.  
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2.1.3.2.6 Combination of two marks 
In these cases the respondent combined two or more distinctive marks in the domain name 
in use. 
The addition of a second mark does not eliminate the impression of association with the 
complainant’s mark no matter if it is another mark owned by the same person or a mark 
owned by third person. 173
 
At this stage a procedural problem arises if the complainant is not owner of all marks in 
issue174 175 and if not all owners are party to the proceeding  since some panels required 
that the complainant has to be owner of all marks in issue or at least is acting on behalf of 
the other owners.176  
Other panels did not require the ownership of all marks since even if the respondent used 
other marks as well; in any case he used a mark the complainant has rights in even if he 
infringed other people rights as well.177
 
To my notion a complaint by the owner of one mark should be sufficient. The complainant 
does not act on the behalf of the owner of the other marks. All he tries to do is to protect 
his mark. Thus it cannot make a difference if the respondent uses the mark in connection 
with a generic (not protected) term or in connection with another protected mark. The 
complainant should not be forced to get in contact with the owner of the other mark to 
face against a possible infringement by a third person. 
I do not think that the one mark, combined with another one, is able to dissociate the 
domain name from the owner of the mark. Therefore I assume that these names will be 
confusingly similar in any case. 
 
2.1.3.2.7 Well-known trademarks 
The importance of the question whether a trademark is a well-known mark under Art. 6 
bis Paris Convention is not quite clear. The usual effect of a well-known mark is that the 
question whether a mark is confusingly similar to another mark does not depend on the 
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similarity of goods or services178 – the use of the well-known mark or of a confusingly 
similar term is sufficient to proof the danger of dilution of this mark. 
The similarity of products or services is of no importance in respect of the UDRP since the 
policy does not take the services or products the domain name has been used for into 
account. All the panel is looking for is the identity or similarity of names (the name of the 
mark and the domain name). 
 
But even if never explicitly expressed it seems to me that the status as a well-known mark 
impacts the determination of similarity. It seems that the more popular a mark is the more 
protection it enjoys.179 Thus a domain name is more likely to be confusingly similar if the 
mark it is similar to is a well-known one. 
 
Additional the status as a well-known mark can impact the question whether the 
respondent acted in bad faith since he must have known about the existence of the 
mark.180  
 
2.2 Sec. 4 (a) (ii) UDRP  
“…you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name…” 
 
According to Sec. 4 (a) (ii) UDRP, the complaint will be successful if the complainant is 
able to proof that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the 
domain name. Even if the policy differs between rights and interests, there is no real 
distinction between these both terms. 
 
Sec. 4(c) of the Policy provides examples of circumstances, which can demonstrate the 
respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the use of a domain name. They can not be 
understood as operative facts. Even if the respondent does not meet any of the examples 
he can have a right or legitimate interest to use the domain name. 
 
Sec. 4 (a) UDRP provides that the “complainant must proof that each of these three 
elements are present”. Since the complainant will hardly be able to proof the absence of 
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181this right , sec. 4 (c) does not only gives examples of circumstances, it also shifts the 
burden of proof from the claimant to the respondent if the complainant had shown prima 
facie that the respondent has not rights or legitimate interests.182
 
It is for the complainant to adduce arguments to establish that prima facie elements are 
present that do indicate the absence of a right or legitimate interest.183 The complainant 
can meet this prima facie evidence by showing that the respondent is a direct competitor, 
the domain name and the mark are very similar184, that there is high probability of 
trademark infringement and that the respondent has neither been known under the domain 
name nor has it used or planned to use the name in connection with the bona fide sale of 
goods or service.185 He can produce prima facie evidence by proofing that the respondent 
has not got the same personal name like the domain name and no other connection to the 
domain name used186 187, is not trading under the same name etc  and that his own mark is 
widely known188. 
 
Thus, the provisions in sec. 4 (c) UDRP are addressed to both parties of the proceeding 
but the primer proof has to be produced by the complainant. Since the complainant cannot 
give full evidence for some of the operative facts, he is allowed to do it in the way of 
prima facie evidence. In case the complainant is successful in producing this prima facie 
evidence he is reverting the onus rebuttal of showing that he has rights or legitimate 
interests to the respondent. 
 
2.2.1 Sec. 4 (c) (i) UDRP 
“... before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to 
use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a 
bona fide offering of goods or services...” 
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2.2.1.1 Demonstrable preparations 
The respondent has to have done at least demonstrable preparations for the use of the 
domain name in connection with the bona fide sale of goods or services. 
The question of “demonstrable preparations” is a factual issue and depends very much on 
the impression the panel gets in the certain case. This is an impression created by a lot of 
small indications.  
Indications can be: 
 
189- Start of the development of the web page  
190 - Existence of business relations
191- Development of a business plan  
192- Availability under the domain name  
193- Contact with authorities for doing business  
194- Development of a logo   
195- Trademark application or registration  
196- Preparation of search engines for launch  
197- Duration of not use of domain name  
198- Contact to investors  
 
But all this factors are indications only. Thus the presence or the absence of such an 
indication is not able to produce any evidence or prevent such a evidence by itself. 
 
2.2.1.2 Before notice of the dispute 
The respondent has to be done these preparations before notice of the dispute. Dispute 
does not mean that there has to be any proceeding, filing or even a complaint. It is just a 
debated state or conflict of opinion199 and includes any disagreement between the parties 
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200concerning the domain name or trademark at issue.  The term notice has to be 
understood as the knowledge of the main factual circumstances. Legal knowledge is not 
necessary.201
Thus, the respondent has to be started with preparations before he has knowledge of the 
facts being the base for the conflict of opinions.  
 
2.2.1.3 Bona fide 
The question is whether the use of the domain name in connection with it is a bona fide 
use.202
The expression “bona fide” shall prevent a respondent who knowingly adopted another’s 
mark as a domain name from claiming the benefit of the popularity in connection with the 
offering of goods and services.203
He must be bona fide in respect of the awareness of a possible trademark infringement 
prior to the domain name registration.204 If the respondent knew or must have known of 
the existence of the mark, he did not use the domain name bona fide.205
 
It is argued whether the use of a mark as a domain name can be bona fide use if the 
respondent used this domain name in his position as a distributor of the goods produced 
under this mark.  
 
In Stanley Works v. Camp Creek the panel stated that a right to use a mark as a domain 
name requires more authorisation than the right to act as a retail seller.206 The use of the 
mark as a domain name would falsely suggest a broader relationship than it is the case in 
fact207 208, it suggests a relationship with the complainant itself . In Ferrero S.p.A. v. 
Fistagi S.r.l. the panel held: “Agreeing with respondent's argument [that he is permitted to 
use the mark in his domain name because he is an authorised dealer] would mean to allow 
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any distributor, wholesaler or retailer to register and monopolize a third party's trademark 
as a domain name, based on the mere fact that it sells those products.”209
 
210In the minority of decisions the panels accepted this right of the respondent  “as an 
exclusive dealer, with the knowledge and consent of the trademark owner, used that 
trademark in the course of its business for the purpose of promoting the sale of the 
principal's product”211 if the domain name disassociates the website from the complainant 
in the way it makes clear that he is a distributor etc. only (e.g. mark-dealer.com or used-
mark-tools.com).212 However, with the end of the relationship as a dealer, the respondent 
loses the basis justifying the registration.213  
 
In my opinion the two attitudes do not differ very much. The important question is 
whether the respondent uses the complainant’s mark for describing his business or for the 
causing confusion in respect of suggesting a close relationship with the complainant.214 
The answer of this question may depend on the strength or weakness of the mark in issue 
and again whether the respondent added another term to make clear that his website is not 
the producer’s one but for example a wholesaler’s website.215 Following there is no big 
difference to the general rule, shown above under 2.1.3.2.3.3 in respect of the use of marks 
in connection with generic words. The term has to be suitable to disassociate the domain 
name from the mark in the way that the consumer cannot get the impression that the 
owner of the mark is the origin of the website. 
 
In connection to these cases a lot of panel decisions held that its role is not the solution of 
cases of trademark infringement but a question for court action 216 and that the UDRP 
might not be the correct proceeding for complex cases of mark infringement. The Policy 
modifies the Justinian principle of "qui prior est tempore, potior est iure" – "first in time, 
first in right" - only where there is clear and unjustifiable misappropriation of 
49 
                                                          
209 Ferrero S.p.A. v. Fistagi S.r.l. D2001-0262 (kinderferrero.com) 
210 Eddy’s (Nottingham) Limited, trading as Superfi v. Mr. Kingsley Smith D2000-0789 (superfi.com); E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Avant Garde Composition D2000-0130 (cromalin.com) 
211 Columbia ParCar Corp. v. S. Brustas GmbH D2001-0779 (columbiaparcar.com) 
212 Giddings & Lewis LLC v. Neal McKean d/b/a Machineworks, Inc. d/b/a IMachineTools.com 
D2000-1150 (usedfadal.net) 
213 Miele, Inc. v. Absolute Air Cleaners and Purifiers D2000-0756 (miele.net) 
214 EAuto, L.L.C. v. EAuto Parts D2000-0096 (eautoparts.com) 
215 Ferrero S.p.A. v. Fistagi S.r.l. D2001-0262 (kinderferrero.com) 
216 Bang & Olufsen America, Inc. v. BeoWorld.com D2001-0159 (beoworld.com) 
  
 
217complainant's mark.  In cases there is no such misappropriation the complainant cannot 
get any support from the UDRP and has to protect his rights in a court proceeding. 
 
2.2.2 Sec. 4 (c) (ii) UDRP 
“...you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by 
the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights...” 
 
Another way to proof the respondent’s right is to show that he has been commonly known 
by the domain name. 
 
In these cases the main criterions for “commonly known” are: 
 
218- Website had content  
219- Website runs for a long time  
220- Website is linked from other pages not related to the respondent  
221- The personal name of the respondent is identical with the domain name  
222- The nickname of the respondent is identical with the domain name  
223- Recognition by authorities or companies under this name  
 
It has to be borne in mind that it is not sufficient to show the use of the domain name and 
the recognition of the domain name by the consumer. The respondent himself has to be 
commonly known under the domain name.224 In some cases of the use of a family name as 
a domain name, the respondent had to be commonly known in respect of the content of the 
website. Further a connection between name and content is necessary.225 In cases of 
identity of a mark with the respondent’s nickname he has to produce a very strong 
evidence to proof that he is known under this nickname.226 An indication for the contrary 
is if he has registered a number of business aliases.227  
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2.2.3 Sec. 4 (c) (iii) UDRP 
“…you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without 
intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark 
or service mark at issue…” 
The third option of proof is the non-commercial fair use of the domain name. 
 
2.2.3.1 Information 
There is no consensus whether a respondent can have legitimate interests in using a 
domain name, containing a mark, for the purpose of criticising the mark owner or his 
products.228
 
But even if free speech is not listed in the policy as an example, it demonstrates a right for 
criticism and commentary. Free speech is recognised as a foundation in a global 
communication network like the internet229 as long as the respondent does not take 
advantage of the commercial activities of the complainant and his interests in the mark.230 
A number of factors have been identified to enlarge the likelihood of recognition of such a 
right. 
 
The respondent is acting free of any commercial interests – he is not offering any products 
or services at all.231 The respondent is not using the “.com” domain name since the owner 
of the mark might want to use it. In case he uses the most favoured “.com” domain name 
the panel is likely to assume the respondents intention to disturb the mark owners 
business.232 Deep linking into the complainants website suggests a relationship to him and 
will not meet the requirement of information or criticism.233 The respondent is not 
connected with a competitor of the complainant in any way.234 The respondent’s site is a 
forum and gives the opportunity to post messages to everybody.235 The domain name 
itself makes the intention of the respondent clear236, disclaimers on the website are not 
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237suitable since they appear after the user is connected to the website . The respondent is a 
non-profit organisation providing information about one or more companies, organisations 
etc. in a substantial extent.238
 
2.2.3.2 Parody 
Parody is recognised as a “literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work 
is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule”239 It is important that the purpose of the 
respondent is really parody and not to tarnish the complainant.240 The website has to be 
used for non-profit purposes and actually used for parody by the time since the domain 
name was registered. The registration for this aim is not enough – it has to be used for that 
purpose exclusively.241 242 Further, the parody has to be focused on the complainant.
 
2.2.3.3 Fan sites 
The same applies to fan sites. The site has to deal with the celebrity etc. itself not with 
celebrities in general243 and it has to provide substantial information about the celebrity. 
This requirement is not met if the respondent uses the name to attract internet users 
only.244 Even if the respondent meets these requirements for the recognition as a fan club 
site, the domain name cannot be used for any commercial gain at all.245
 
2.2.4 Respondent is owner of a similar trademark 
The respondent has a very strong argument for his right to use the domain name if he 
owns a mark similar to the complainants ones. Situations like this can arise since the 
system of trademark registration is, in opposite to the domain name system, national or 
regional and divided in classes of products or services. Following, more than one person 
can own an identical or confusingly similar mark as long as they do not operate in the 
same market or the same industry. 
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In these cases the panel cannot transfer the domain name since the respondent registered 
the domain name first and has the right to use it. 
 
In a lot of cases dealing with conflicting marks, the panel held that the complex 
determinations are better made in a court proceeding.246 The aim of the proceeding is to 
deal with abusive registration and not with conflicting marks.247
The panel cannot assume that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the 
name if he owns a corresponding mark.248 Of importance may be whether the respondent 
registered and used the mark before the commencement of the proceeding.249 In case the 
panel gets the impression the respondent registered the mark to protect the domain name it 
is very likely to order the transfer or cancellation of the domain name.250
 
2.3 Sec. 4 (a) (iii) UDRP 
“…your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.” 
 
The respondent has to have registered and used the domain name in bad faith. Sec. 4 (b) 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) UDRP give examples of bad faith. As above the complainant has to 
proof that the respondent acted in bad faith – the wording of the policy is very clear.251
Bad faith has to be understood in respect of the existence of a mark. The respondent acted 
in bad faith if he was aware of the existence of the mark owned by the complainant and a 
possible infringement.252
 
As stated in a couple of decision the distinction between the showing of the absence of a 
legitimate right or interest according sec. 4(a)(ii) of the policy and showing of bad faith of 
registration and use of the domain name according to 4(a)(iii) is not that clear in reality as 
suggested in the wording of the UDRP.253 Absence of any right or interest on the part of 
the respondent may be an indication for the assumption of bad faith and the registration 
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and use in bad faith may be of assistance in determining the legitimacy of the claimed 
right or interest as well.254
 
2.3.1 Subsequent bad faith 
As shown above, the respondent has to have registered and used the domain name in bad 
faith.  
The respondent has to act in good faith at the time of registration. Thus he did not register 
in bad faith even if he lost the justifying basis after the registration.255 A registration in 
good faith cannot change into one in bad faith later. 
 
A problem arises by the exactly reading of sec. 4 (a) (iii) UDRP since it reads “and is 
being used in bad faith”. This would mean that the owner of the mark has to wait until the 
respondent made use of the domain name. Already in the very first decision the panel held 
that “use” does not necessarily requires the launch of a website. Even the offer for sale can 
be use.256
To my opinion the respondent does not have to have used the domain name at all since, as 
I will show below, the non-use of the domain name itself can be an indication for bad 
faith. 257 But if he used it, he has to have done it in bad faith. 
 
2.3.2 Is being used 
“Is being used” does not mean “use” in the particular moment of the panel decision. One 
has to look at the kind of use during the whole period from the registration on. Otherwise 
the respondent could avoid the transfer by changing the use in case of a complaint.258
 
2.3.3 How to proof 
Again the complainant can produce evidence by prima facie since he can hardly proof bad 
faith, as a subjective element. Sufficient for a prima facie evidence would be the proof of 
the fact that the mark in issue is widely known in the relevant (the respondent’s) region of 
the world259 and that the respondent must have been aware of the probability of the 
infringement. For answering the question of the awareness the extent of kind of 
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recognition of the mark (regional, national, global etc.) and the place of residence of the 
respondent can be decisive.260  
 
Sec. 4 (b) (i) to (iv) UDRP provides some examples of evidence for the registration and 
use in bad faith. Again, these points are examples only and the respondent can act in bad 
faith even if he did not act in one of described ways. 
 
2.3.4 Sec. 4 (b) (i) UDRP Purpose of sale 
“circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain 
name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain 
name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark 
or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your 
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name…” 
 
The first example deals with a respondent who offers the domain name for sale. 
Thus the respondent was acting in bad faith if he registered the domain name “for the 
purpose of selling” etc.  
 
The actual offer to sale the domain name, can be an indication for the registration for the 
purpose of selling. 261 But that does not mean that every offer to sell etc. a domain name is 
an absolute indication for bad faith. The respondent did not act in bad faith if, 
 
- he had a legitimate interest in the moment of registration. For example as a website 
for information or as a distributor of the complainant.262 
263- was not aware of the existence of the mark at the moment of registration.  The 
complainant has to proof the intention of sale in the moment of registration, not just 
the offer itself.264 The multi-registration of a lot of domain names identical or 
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confusingly similar to marks by the respondent or marks owned by other persons can 
indicate bad faith. 265 
266- he offers the domain for out-of-pocket costs which he is able to document.  The 
costs of registering is less than $ 100.267 
268- he used the domain name in good faith.  
 
2.3.5 Acquisition of the domain name 
In case of an acquisition of a domain name by the respondent from a another person 
(original registrant). the time of acquisition is relevant. Whether the first registrant did act 
in bad faith or not does not matter.269 Accordingly the actual respondent has to have 
acquired the domain name in bad faith.270
 
2.3.5.1 Sec. 4 (b) (ii) UDRP Prevent owner from using the domain name 
“…you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark 
or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that 
you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct…” 
 
2.3.5.2 Prevent owner of a corresponding mark 
271A domain name is “corresponding” to a mark if it includes the name of the mark.
 
Aim of the respondent has to be the prevention of the registration by the complainant for a 
domain name corresponding to the mark he owns. If the respondent has a plausible reason 
for his registration he might not act to prevent the complainant of registration. This might 
be the case if the complainant already registered for another domain name corresponding 
with his mark.272 For example if the complainant already registered “3m-tapes.com” and 
the respondent registered “3m-tapes.info”. The wording requires the registration to 
prevent the complainant from registering a corresponding domain name – following the 
respondent has to be acted with this intention. But in at least one case the panel did not 
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require the purpose of prevention but the only acceptance of the natural consequences of 
the acts by the respondent.273
 
2.3.5.3 Pattern of conduct 
A strong indication for this “pattern of conduct” is the multi registration either of a domain 
name similar to one mark274 275 or similar to different marks.  Another indication can be the 
registration of the full name of the mark and its abbreviation276 and different type of 
misspellings277 278 as well as earlier decisions against the respondent .  
In these cases the panel is very likely to assume a pattern of such conduct. 
 
2.3.6 Sec. 4 (b) (iii) UDRP For disrupting business of a competitor 
“…you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the 
business of a competitor…” 
 
2.3.6.1 Competitor 
The policy does not define the term “competitor”. In either case a person acting in 
opposition of the complainant is a competitor.279 The respondent is not acting in 
opposition if he is active in a different industry.280 But it has been held that the term 
competitor does not imply any restricted meaning as a commercial or business competitor. 
In this decision the panel stated that the respondent criticising the complainant can act as a 
competitor nevertheless.281 In other decisions the panels held that the scope of the term 
competitor should be limited to parties competing on a market of good and service.282 The 
panel will assume that the respondent is a competitor if he promotes on his website 
information to products of competitors of the complainant.283
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2.3.6.2 Disrupting business 
The operative fact “disrupting” seems to be mixed up with “attempt to attract, for 
commercial gain…”.284 The mere use of a complainant’s trademark as a domain name 
does not constitute disruption of the his business. Even if the respondent prevents the 
complainant from using his trademark as a “.com” domain name, he still can use other 
TLDs for his website.285 The main factors are the confusion and re-direction of internet 
users to another website than expected.286
 
2.3.7 Sec. 4 (b) (iv) UDRP Intentionally attempt to attract internet user for 
commercial gain 
“…by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial 
gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 




“Attract” means that the respondent takes advantage of the high search engine ranking of a 
domain name to direct internet traffic to his website. The high search ranking must be 
directly connected to the popularity of the complainants mark.287  
If the content of the respondent’s website is not in any relation to the used domain name or 
name of the mark the panel is more likely to assume the intention to attract internet 
users.288 In cases like that, it is no sufficient remedy to set a link from the respondent’s 
website to the complainant’s one. In theses cases internet users looking for the 
complainant’s website have been directed to the respondent’s website already and 
therefore attracted already to the own website before they can read the link.289 It is even 
worse and without any doubt attraction for commercial gain if the internet user cannot 
58 
                                                          
284 Freytag-Berndt und Artaria Kommanditgesellschaft v. Leimgruber A. & Co. OHG D2002-1077 (freytag-
berndt.com) 
285 Goldberg & Osborne v. The Advisory Board Forum, Inc. D2001-0711 (theinjurylawyers.com) 
286 Express Messenger Systems, Inc. v. Golden State Overnight D2001-0063 (californiaovernight.com); 
Ansell Healthcare Products Inc. v. Australian Therapeutics Supplies Pty, Ltd. D2001-0110 
(ansellcondoms.com) 
287 Sibyl Avery Jackson v. Jan Teluch D2002-1180 (sibylaveryjackson.com) 
288 Ltd Commodities, Inc v. DBS Administration Pty Ltd D2002-0681 (lakeside-collections.com) 
289 Ltd Commodities, Inc v. DBS Administration Pty Ltd D2002-0681 (lakeside-collections.com) 
  
 
recognise at all that they did not visit the complainant’s website after they have been 
connected and do business with the respondent instead of the complainant.290
 
2.3.7.2 Likelihood of confusion 
In respect of the point of time of the “likelihood of confusion” the policy and the panel 
decisions are ambiguous. It is not clear whether the internet users have to be confused 
before they arrived at the website only291 or if they still have to be confused once they are 
connected to the respondent’s website.292  
 
In any case the consumer has to be confused by the website in respect of source of the 
website, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of your website or location or of a 
product or service on your website or location.293 Thus, any kind of confusion in respect 
of the relation between the respondent’s site and the complainant or his products or 
services is sufficient. 
 
2.3.7.3 Commercial gain 
294Predominantly “commercial gain” is the offer of products or services.  It is not 
necessary that the website with the domain name itself has been used for commercial gain. 
It is sufficient if this website contains a link to another site used for commercial gain. By 
doing so, the original website has been used indirectly for commercial gain.295
 
In at least one case the panel decided to assume the presence of “commercial gain” in 
respect of a website used for religious purposes. “The ‘commercial gain’ of attracting 
viewers for the purpose of soliciting them to ‘join LOVE-OF-GOD-JESUS’ is consistent 
with the concept of ‘commerce’ is expansively interpreted under United States law, which 
applies to charitable and political activities as well as traditional mercantile activities.”296
 
In my opinion this might be correct since the words “products or services” in sec. 4 (b) 
(iv) UDRP have to have understood in connection with the word “confusion” not with 
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“gain”. Thus the commercial gain does not have to result out of the offer of products and 
services. 
 
2.3.8 Other indications of bad faith 
As said above the policy provides examples for bad faith only. The respondent can act in 
bad faith without fulfilling any of these examples. In the often-cited Telstra Corporation 
Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows case the panel stated that “the circumstances identified 
in paragraph 4(b) are without limitation” and that “the administrative panel must give 
close attention to all the circumstances of the respondent’s behaviour.”297 Thus, even if 
there is no evidence for one of the examples in sec. 4 (b) UDRP the panel can recognise 
bad faith if the circumstances provide sufficient indications. 
 
2.3.8.1 Non-use of the domain name 
A possible indication of bad faith is the non-use of the domain name. Some panels 
recognise the passive holding of the domain name as an indication beside the examples 
provided in sec. 4 (b) UDRP298, others as an indication for the purpose of disrupting 
according sec. 4 (b) (iii) UDRP.299
  
In Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows the panel stated further that it 
has to be has to considered “whether the passive holding of a domain name, following a 
bad faith registration of it, satisfies the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii). A remedy can 
be obtained under the Uniform Policy only if those circumstances show that the 
respondent’s passive holding amounts to acting in bad faith.”300  
To my opinion passive holding can be an indication for the purpose of selling, the 
prevention of the mark holder to register a corresponding domain name, the purpose to 
disrupt the business of a competitor or for bad faith in general. The different indications 
and examples overlap each other. 
 
2.3.8.2 Installation of a counter only 
If the respondent installs only a counter on the website in issue it can be an indication for 
bad faith since all the respondent is using the domain name and the connected website for 
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301is counting the internet traffic visiting the certain website.  This is a very common way 
to proof the value of a domain name. 
 
2.3.8.3 Indicating a wrong address or email address by registration 
An additional indication for bad faith can be that the respondent has taken active steps to 
conceal its true identity, by operating under a wrong name etc.302
 
2.3.8.4 No response during the proceeding 
Even the absence of a response of the respondent during the proceeding has been 
considered as an indication for bad faith.303
 
2.3.8.5 No legitimate use of the domain name possible 
The same has to be said if there is no use without infringing the mark of the complainant 
possible.304 For example if the domain name contents exclusively of a well-known 
trademark without any kind of prefix or suffix. 
 
2.3.8.6 Use as a pornographic website 
In at least one case the panel held that the use of a mark in association with a website 
containing pornographic material can itself constitute bad faith. 305 
 
3. Conclusion 
As already shown at different stages of this work some of the operative facts of sec. 4 (a), 
(b) and (c) UDRP are not very clear. They leave a lot of space for interpretation. The panel 
decisions, even if mostly of only one provider, differ in many cases as well. 
 
One reason for that might be that several questions have to be decided by the national law 
of the respondent. The UDRP is a set of rules in a very complex environment and makes 
use of a lot of different legal principles to find a solution. This problem could be avoided 
only by the determination for just one applicable national law. But trademark law for 
example is still national law and it would not be fair to decide a dispute under a different 
law than the has respondent registered under. 
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The interpretation of “confusingly similar” in cases like the “nokiagirls.com” case is going 
to far and leads to the allegations the UDRP would protect the interests of the owner of 
marks in the first place. These complainants could be prevented if the panels would decide 
the cases with bearing in mind the intention of the policy. 
 
Further in a lot of decisions the panel mixed up the operative facts of different 
subsections. A reason for that might be the non-exhaustive nature of sec. 4 (b) and (c) 
UDRP. Some panels picked up some facts out of the rules provided and mix them up with 
some other they had in mind. Additional some questions never or almost never arise in the 
reasons and seem to be self-evident. For example the question what “commercial gain” 
exactly can be arise in only very view cases. I did not find one case really dealing with the 
definition of “other on-line location”. 
Especially in sec. 4 (b) (vi) UDRP most operative facts seem to be only one, decided by 
the question if the panel identified bad faith in the circumstances or not. 
 
With regard to the distinction of the absence of any right or legitimate interest in respect 
of the domain name and the question of the presence of bad faith on the other hand some 
panels expressively mentioned the interaction of the affirmation of for the determination 
of the other. This cannot be criticised as long as this interaction results out of the 
overlapping of indications. As soon as the pure affirmation of one issue leads to positive 
result of the other one, one of both elements is superfluous. 
 
Some of the complaints about the alleged bias of the UDRP in favour of the commercial 
users of the internet might be related to the lack of protection of pure personal names. This 
lack is not a problem possibly resolved by rewriting the policy but a problem of the huge 
differences in the international protection of these names. Too big differences in the 
national applicable law would make the outcome even more unpredictable than now. 
 
As shown above in numerous cases the panel itself noted that the dispute in question is not 
suitable for a proceeding under the UDRP. Especially cases where both parties allege to 
have rights in an identical or similar mark, are going far over the scope of the UDRP. In 
these cases the panels denied the complainant. The damage possible is just too big as that 
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the panel could transfer the domain name grounded on findings gained with an inadequate 
tool. 
 
Despite of these uncertainties resulting out of different reasons, with these interpretations 
in mind, hopefully the outcome of the UDRP proceeding will become much more 
predictable. 
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